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INTRODUCTION
The Public Trust Doctrine in Louisiana
Louisiana's coastal zone is one of the most unique areas of the
world. It is a place in which physical change is constant and where
what is land today can become open water tomorrow. The interplay of
land and water in Louisiana's coastal zone has influenced the devel-
opment of a culture that is as unique as its geographical surroundings.
Such an area makes it difficult to lay down permanent legal rules
for the management of the physical environment; law is not at its best
when applied to nature's whims. However, in Louisiana, legislators, legal
scholars, judges, and legal practitioners have attempted to bring legal
order to this dynamic geographical area.
We will attempt, in this article, to explain one body of legal principles
that we feel helps to bring legal order to this area: the public trust
doctrine.
Recently, legislation has been proposed that we feel would remove
valuable areas of Louisiana's coastal region from the public trust. Our
legal analysis indicates that the rights and interests of the public as a
whole in these coastal areas would be compromised by the proposed
legislation. We will, therefore, take a position which argues in favor of
including the disputed areas in the public trust in hopes of bringing
balance to this important decision.
The purpose of this article is to examine the state of the public
trust doctrine in Louisiana and how its application affects natural re-
sources and environmental protection there. We will examine the history
of the public trust doctrine and its origins in Louisiana. We will discuss
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the manifestation or expression of the public trust doctrine in Louisiana
law and jurisprudence, including new challenges to the scope of the
doctrine. We will argue for an expansive interpretation of the public
trust doctrine based on recent jurisprudence and describe how the doc-
trine may affect Louisiana's state agencies in their administration of
public lands, natural resources, and environmental protection.
BACKGROUND
Many people in Louisiana have not heard of the public trust doctrine
or have only vague notions of it. It is not surprising that the public
trust doctrine is obscure to many people including some in the legal
community. Elements of the doctrine are scattered throughout the Louis-
iana Civil Code, the Revised Statutes, the Louisiana Constitution of
1974, and several Louisiana judicial decisions. No single Louisiana law
clearly defines the public trust doctrine and delineates its elements. In
that respect Louisiana is not unique among states, for the public trust
doctrine has evolved in a slightly different way in each state, with some
unique terminology and various levels of codification and jurisprudential
development. Professor Sax, in his extensive article on the public trust
doctrine, describes how it has evolved from a loosely related set of
ideas.' The central idea of the doctrine-is now well established. Recently
a comprehensive national study of this doctrine provided a general
definition:
The Public Trust Doctrine provides that public trust lands, waters
and living resources in a State are held by the State in trust
for the benefit of all of the people, and establishes the right
of the public to fully enjoy public trust lands, waters and living
resources for a wide variety of recognized public uses. The Public
Trust Doctrine is applicable whenever navigable waters or the
lands beneath are altered, developed, conveyed, or otherwise
managed or preserved. It applies whether the trust lands are
publicly or privately owned. The doctrine articulates not only
the public rights in these lands and waters. It also sets limitations
on the States, the public, and private owners, as well as estab-
lishing duties and responsibilities of the States when managing
these public trust assets. The Public Trust Doctrine has been
recognized and affirmed by the United States Supreme Court,
the lower federal courts and State courts from the beginning
days of this country to the present.2
1. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 475-89 (1970).
2. Coastal States Organization, Putting the Public Trust Doctrine to Work, at 3-4
(1990).
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The public trust doctrine is based on the Institutes of Justinian and
eventually became part of the English common law.3 It was transferred
to the common law states via English law, but can fairly be said to
have come to Louisiana through the French and Spanish civil law
traditions which were themselves based on Roman law.4 Indeed, Louis-
iana received a "double dose" of the public trust doctrine, because
upon admission to the Union in 1812 it was, under the equal footing
doctrine, accorded the same rights as the states before it in lands beneath
tidal and navigable waters.5 Thus, the English common law version of
the public trust doctrine was superimposed over Louisiana's civil law
version in 1812. It would appear then, that since 1812 the opportunity
has existed for Louisiana's public trust doctrine to be at least as expansive
as that in many common law states, if it was not so already.
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
Many scholarly articles and at least one treatise have delved exten-
sively into the historical origins and development of the public trust
doctrine.6 It is not our intention to revisit these topics, but merely to
outline the origin and development of the public trust doctrine in order
to provide a framework for better understanding.
Under Roman law the sea and seashore, the air, and running water
were common things. 7 The Spanish and French law, on which the
Louisiana Civil Code is based, continued to classify rivers and the sea
3. Id. at 4-5.
4. A. Yiannopoulos, Property § 65, at 120 in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1991)
[hereinafter Yiannopoulos Treatise]; A.N. Yiannopoulos, Five Babes Lost in the Tide--A
Saga of Land Titles in Two States: Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 62 Tul. L. Rev.
1357, 1360 (1988) [hereinafter Yiannopoulos Article].
5. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 108 S. Ct. 791, 795-97 (1988).
6. Bernard S. Cohen, The Constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Environment,
1970 Utah L. Rev. 388; Alfred A. Porro, Jr. & Lorraine S. Teleky, Marshland Title Dilemma:
A Tidal Phenomenom, 3 Seton Hall L. Rev. 323 (1972); Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the
Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 185 (1980); Joseph
L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L.J. 149 (1971); Joseph L.
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention. 68
Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970); Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative
Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 195 (1980); Robert E.
Tarcza, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Basis for Environmental Litigation in
Louisiana, 27 Loy. L. Rev. 469 (1981); William Drayton, Jr., Comment, The Public Trust
in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 Yale L.J. 762 (1970); Nelea
A. Absher, Note, Constitutional Law and the Environment: Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana
Environmental Control Commission, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 1557 (1985).
7. Coastal States Organization, supra note 2, at 4-5; The Institutes of Justinian 35
(J.B. Moyle trans. 4th ed. 1905).
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and seashore as common things insusceptible of private ownership., The
current Louisiana Civil Code classifies "running waters, the waters and
bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the territorial sea, and the
seashore" as public things which "are owned by the state or its political
subdivisions in their capacity as public persons, ' 9 (i.e., in public trust).
More recently, Louisiana has enacted other statutes implementing and
delineating the public trust doctrine, and there has been some judicial
interpretation which will be discussed in the next section.
The English common law public trust doctrine also traces its ancestry
to Roman law.' 0 As early as the 13th century, portions of Justinian's
Institutes dealing with the public trust doctrine had found their way to
England." Some elements of the doctrine were written into the Magna
Carta. 2 The English common law version of the public trust doctrine,
however, changed the beds of navigable rivers from common, ownerless
things to things owned by the Crown for the benefit of the public. 3
It is significant to note that in England the test of navigability was the
ebb and flow of the tide, since there were almost no water bodies that
were navigable in fact that were not also influenced by the tides.' 4
When the English colonies in America were established, they are
considered to have been passed the same sovereign rights and respon-
sibilities with regard to public trust lands as afforded by English law.'5
Likewise when the colonies gained independence from England "and
took into their own hands the powers of sovereignty, the prerogatives
and regalities which before belonged either to the crown or the parlia-
ment, became immediately and rightfully vested in the state(s),"' 6 in-
cluding the public trust doctrine. As each new state was admitted to
the Union, it was placed on "equal footing" with the existing states,
including the ownership of public trust lands within its territory."
8. Yiannopoulos Treatise, supra note 4, at 120, 129; Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust:
A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 195, 197 (1980).
9. La. Civ. Code art. 450.
10. Coastal States Organization, supra note 2, at 5; William Drayton, Jr., Comment,
The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 Yale L.J.
762, 763-68 (1970); Sax, supra note I, at 476.
I1. Stevens, supra note 8, at 197; Bernard S. Cohen, The Constitution, The Public Trust
Doctrine, and the Environment, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 388, 389.
12. Drayton, Comment, supra note 10, at 765-68; Cohen, supra note It, at 389; Coastal
States Organization, supra note 2, at 5.
13. Stevens, supra note 8, at 197-98.
14. Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. State of Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435-36; 13 S. Ct. 110,
111-12 (1892).
15. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 413 (1842).
16. Id. at 416.
'17. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 474-77, 108 S. Ct. 791, 794-
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The geographical extent of the public trust waterbottoms transferred
to the states under the equal footing doctrine has been established by
a long line of United States Supreme Court cases." The latest Supreme
Court pronouncement on the geographical scope of the public trust
doctrine, Phillips Petroleum, makes perfectly clear that the trust has
historically extended and presently extends to all waters affected by the
ebb and flow of the tide, whether or not navigable, as well as to
nontidal navigable waters. 19
The public rights of use protected by the public trust doctrine are
not limited to navigation, commerce, and fishing. 20 Other uses protected
by the public trust doctrine include traditional recreational uses such as
swimming and hunting, and recently recognized uses such as environ-
mental protection.2'
One of the most important questions concerning the public trust
doctrine in the United States, a question pertinent to the discussion
here, is whether a state may relinquish the ownership of public trust
lands to private parties so that public uses are no longer protected. It
is well known that states may, under certain circumstances, alienate
public trust waterbottoms. This principle was set forth as early as 1894
in Shively2" and restated recently in Phillips.2" But this power is not
absolute; indeed it appears to operate within fairly strict confines. The
most important judicial interpretation of this issue is in Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Illinois.24 The case arose after the Illinois legislature
had in 1869 granted to the Illinois Central Railroad Co. and two other
railroad companies a large tract comprising approximately one thousand
acres of the bed of Lake Michigan. Realizing it had erred, the Illinois
legislature repealed the grant in 1873 and reclaimed title to the submerged
lands. 2 The United States Supreme Court, finding the repeal valid and
the ownership of the submerged lands to be with the state,2 6 announced
95 (1988); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1. 57, 14 S. Ct. 548, 569 (1894); Knight v. United
States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183, 12 S. Ct. 258, 264 (1891); Gulf Oil Corp. v. State
Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d 576, 588-89 (La. 1975).
18. Shively, 152 U.S. at 57, 14 S. Ct. at 569; Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 435, 13 S.
Ct. at I11 (1892); Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh. 53 U.S. 443 (1851).
19. Phillips, 484 U.S. at 476-81, 108 S. Ct. at 795-97.
20. Id., 108 S. Ct. at 795.97; Coastal States Organization, supra note 2, Chapter I11;
Sax, supra note 1, generally.
21. Coastal States Organization, supra note 2, at Chapter 1II; Save Ourselves Inc. v.
Louisiana Envt'l Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (La. 1984); Sax, supra note 1,
generally.
22. Shively, 152 U.S. at 26, 14 S. Ct. at 557.
23. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 482-85, 108 S. Ct. 791, 798-
99 (1988).
24. 146 U.S. 387, 452-56, 13 S. Ct. 110, 118-19 (1892).
25. Id. at 449, 13 S. Ct. at 117.
26. Id. at 463-64, 13 S. Ci. at 122.
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that there are limitations on a state's authority to dispose of public
trust waterbottoms. Because the title a state holds in public trust wa-
terbottoms is "different in character from that which the State holds
in lands intended for sale," 21 a state may dispose of them only under
certain circumstances. A state may, to improve the interest of the people,
grant parcels of submerged lands for such things as "wharves, docks
and piers," 2 but it may not abdicate
general control of the State over lands under the navigable waters
of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake. Such abdication
is not consistent with the exercise of that trust, which requires
the government of the State to preserve such waters for the use
of the public.2 9
The Court, in reiterating its position, stated the circumstances under
which a state could relinquish control over public trust property: "The
control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost,
except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the
public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment
of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining." 3 So it appears
from Illinois Central that state alienation of public trust property that
does not promoie public interests and impairs substantially the public
interest is "necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by which
the property was held by the State can be resumed at any time."',
Illinois Central upheld state revocation of a grant of public trust
waterbottoms to private interests and set parameters under which such
a grant could be revoked. In Appleby v. City of New York,32 the Court
revisited the issue of state alienation of public trust waterbottoms, up-
holding a sale of "water lots" in the Hudson River to private parties
by the city of New York. The lots were to be used for wharves and
to be bulkheaded and filled. Appleby has been described as limiting the
holding in Illinois Central Railroad, but the United States Supreme
Court reconciled the two cases by indicating that the situation in Appleby
fell within the exception provided in Illinois Central:
That case [Illinois Central] arose in the Circuit Court of the
United States, and the conclusion reached was necessarily a
statement of Illinois law, but the general principle and the
27. Id. at 452, 13 S. Ct. at 118.
28. Id. at 452, 13 S. Ct. at 118.
29. Id. at 452-53, 13 S. Ct. at 118.
30. Id. at 453, 13 S. Ct. at 118.
31. Id. at 455, 13 S. Ct. at 119.
32. 271 U.S. 364, 46 S. Ct. 569 (1926).
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exception have been recognized the country over and have been
approved in several cases in the State of New York."
The Court in Appleby then reviewed several New York cases which
had either held or stated in dicta that alienation of public trust lands
would be valid if done for some public purpose or benefit . 4 The Court
apparently considered the sale of the relatively small water lots to be
in furtherance of a public benefit, not an "abdication of the general
control of the state over lands under the navigable waters of an entire
harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake."" The sale by Illinois of the large
tract of Lake Michigan was considered to be such an invalid abdication.
Therefore, even after Appleby, state authority to alienate public trust
waterbottoms appears to' be limited to transfers of portions or parcels
of those waterbottoms that further the public interest or do not sub-
stantially impair the public interest in the "lands and waters remain-
ing." ' 36 A state would probably not be within its authority in relinquishing
control over large public trust areas 3 such as, for instance, if a state
were to alienate all of its nonnavigable tidelands. Illinois Central has
been applied to Louisiana in Gulf Oil v. State Mineral Board.38
Other limitations on state authority to alienate public trust water-
bottoms have been established throughout the United States. To ind a-
valid alienation of public trust waterbottoms, most courts require that
the legislative transfer be clear, specific, and express; courts will seldom
uphold those that are implied.' 9 Another facet of public trust transfers
is a presumption that when public trust lands are alienated, the only
interest conveyed is the jus privatum or private ownership interests, while
the public interests or jus publicum remain with the state.?° In other
words, a servitude of public use would remain on public trust lands
conveyed to private owners. Louisiana recognizes such an arrangement
with respect to the banks of navigable rivers and streams which are
33. Id. at 395, 46 S. Ct. at 578 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 395-96, 46 S. Ct. at 578-79.
35. Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. State of Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53, 13 S. Ct. I10,
118 (1892).
36. Id. at 453, 13 S. Ct. at 118 (1892).
37. Id. at 452-53, 13 S. Ct. at 118 (1892).
38. 317 So. 2d 576, 589, 591 (La. 1975).
39. The requirement for express and specific language when alienating public trust wa-
terbottoms had been established in federal law in Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842),
and in state courts, see Coastal States Organization, supra note 2, at 177 (1990). The Louisiana
Supreme Court has stated in Gulf "Oil that clear and express language is required for the
alienation of navigable waterbottoms (if at all possible); see infra text accompanying notes
143-44. The Gulf Oil reasoning can be applied to nonnavigable tidelands; see infra text
accompanying notes 72-85.
40. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I, 11-12, 14 S. Ct. 548, 551-52 (1894); Coastal States
Organization, supra note 2, at 176-77.
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private things subject to public use." The jus publicum can be termi-
nated, but again courts have almost always required express intent and
furtherance of the public interest . 2 The court in Appleby held that a
"deed in fee simple" to water lots for filling in the Hudson River
constituted a termination of the jus publicum.4 Many other cases from
across the United States have demonstrated much more judicial skep-
ticism in finding a termination of the jus publicum.44
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLic TRUST DOCTRINE IN LOUISIANA
With the overview of some basic parameters of the public trust
doctrine in mind, we will now examine how it has been applied in
Louisiana.- Since Louisiana derived its law from the French and Spanish
who ruled over its territory prior to statehood, some public trust prin-
ciples were in place prior to its admission as'a state in 18 12 .4 The 1808
Civil Code classified the sea and seashore as common things and nav-
igable rivers as public things; this classification was continued in the
1825 and 1870 codes. 6 The 1978 Civil Code changed the classification
of sea and seashore to public things.' 7 When Louisiana became a state
in 1812, it was afforded the same rights over sovereignty lands as other
states on an equal footing.'8 These sovereignty (public trust) lands in-
cluded lands under all waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide,
whether or not navigable, and all navigable waters not subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide.' 9
41. La. Civ. Code art. 456; Chaney v. State Mineral Board, 444 So. 2d 105, 109 (La.
1983).
42. Coastal States Organization, supra note 2, at 183-85.
43. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 396-97, 46 S. Ct. 569, 578-79 (1926).
44. Coastal States Organization, supra note 2, at 175-85.
45. Yiannopoulos Treatise, supra note 4, at 119-20; Code Napol6on art. 538:
Highways, roads, and streets maintained by the nation, navigable or floatable rivers
and streams, the shores, accretions and derelictions of the sea, sea ports, harbors,
road steads, and in general all portions of the national territory which are not
susceptible of private ownership, are considered as pertaining to the public domain.
46. La. Civ. Code arts. 450, 453 (1808); La. Civ. Code arts. 441, 444 (1825); La. Civ.
Code arts. 450, 453 (1870).
47. La. Civ. Code art. 450.
48. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57, 14 S. Ct. 548, 569 (1894); Knight v. United
States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183, 12 S. Ct. 258, 264 (1891). The principle of inherent
sovereignty as a basis for state ownership of public trust waterbottoms has been questioned
[see Yiannopoulos Treatise, supra note 4, at 118-191, however, for the purposes of the
discussion herein we will assume that Louisiana acquired ownership of public trust water-
bottoms by virtue of its inherent sovereignty since that terminology is freely used in Louisiana
jurisprudence.
49. Shively, 152 U.S. at 57, 14 S. Ct. at 569; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,
484 U.S. 469, 476-79, 108 S. Ct. 791, 795-96 (1988).
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So in 1812, by virtue of Louisiana's own pre-statehood legislation,
navigable rivers and the sea and its shores were in the state's public
trust, and under the equal footing doctrine Louisiana owned as sov-
ereignty lands (i.e., in public trust) all lands under water affected by
the ebb and flow of the tide and all land under non-tidal navigable
water bodies.50
GEOOGAPmCAL SCOPE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN LOUISIANA
States may manage their public trust lands in accordance with state
law, subject to the conditions already discussed." Therefore, we will
now examine Louisiana's public trust responsibilities under its own laws
since 1812 and how the state has managed its public trust lands. Because
the Civil Code classified navigable rivers and the sea and its shores
within the public trust, Louisiana has managed them accordingly, never
expressly alienating them. The treatment of nonnavigable tidelands, how-
ever, has been unclear.
Louisiana's unique geography has led to a great deal of confusion
in determining the extent of the state's public trust lands. Louisiana has
about 40% of the nation's coastal wetlands, a vast amount of acreage."
Louisiana's wetlands are comprised of low-lying salt, brackish, and fresh
marshes, many of them subject to tidal inundation from the daily ebb
and flow of the tides, and literally thousands of lakes, bays, coves,
rivers, bayous, streams, and tidal passes, a great number of which are
also affected by the daily ebb and flow of the tides. Both lands-subject
to daily tidal inundation such as shores, tidal flats, etc.-and water
bodies-affected by the daily ebb and flow of the tides-can be said
to be tidally influenced (by astronomical tides). Much of the Louisiana
coastal region is subject to tidal overflow from wind-driven tides during
hurricanes, storms, or high winds. These wind-driven tides can have a
greater effect on overflow than the daily ebb and flow in some areas.
Large coastal areas were also overflowed by flood waters from the
numerous rivers, streams, bayous, etc., especially before the extensive
levee building that has occurred in the last century. The boundaries
between land and water in Louisiana's coastal wetlands are very often
indistinct; this is the nature of wetlands. To complicate matters, Louis-
iana's coastal wetlands have been fluctuating for thousands of years
* between periods of expansion and recession, depending on factors such
50. Yiannopoulos Article, supra note 4, at 1359.
51. Shively, 152 U.S. at 26, 14 S. Ct. at 557; Phillips, 484 U.S. at 476-79, 108 S. Ct.
at 795-96.
52. Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, Coastal Louisiana: Here Today Gone To-
morrow? 5 (1989).
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as sea level, subsidence rate, and sediment deposition." Soon after
Europeans and other nonnatives began inhabiting southern Louisiana,
they introduced new factors affecting wetlands, such as dredging and
filling, levees, and canals . 4 It is now well established that levees and
canals have accelerated natural wetland loss; recent estimates are that
thirty square miles of Louisiana coastal wetlands are lost each year."
The dynamic changes of the Louisiana coast have important im-
plications under the state's property laws and the public trust doctrine.
Erosion and subsidence on the shores of the sea and other navigable
water bodies have the effect of increasing state ownership as the beds
of those water bodies expand.56 Consequently, state public trust own-
ership extends to the new beds up to the mean high water mark for
lakes"7 and to the extent of the highest winter tides for the sea.5"
The confusion in Louisiana's management of its public trust lands
caused by the state's unique wetland topography is apparent from the
statutes and jurisprudence dealing with this subject starting in the mid-
1800's and continuing through the 1991 legislative session.59 In 1849 and
1850 the United States transferred to Louisiana (among other states)
ownership of "swamp and overflowed lands, made unfit thereby for
cultivation" to be disposed of by the states as they saw fit to promote
reclamation. 60 These grants consisted of tracts which encompassed public
trust waterbottoms, both navigable-in-fact water bodies, including the
sea and its shores, and nonnavigable tidelands as described in Phillips."
One thing is clear concerning these federal grants: many people seem
to have been confused about the definition of "swamp and overflowed
lands" and the relationship to tidelands and seashore.62 There is ample
evidence that the federal grants did not include navigable waters and
tidal waters; nevertheless, such waterbottoms were apparently sold as
53. Shea Penland, Ron Boyd, and John R. Suter, Transgressive Depositional Systems
of the Mississippi Depositional Plain: A Model for Barrier Shoreline and Shelf Sand De-
velopment, 58 J. Sedimentology Petrology 932 (1988).
54. Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, supra note 52, at 16-17.
55. May, et al., [U.S. Army Corps of Engineers] Geological Investigation of the Mis-
sissippi River Deltaic Plain, Technical Report GL-84-15 (1984); Louis D. Britsch and E.
Burton Kemp, III, Land Loss Rates: Mississippi River Deltaic Plain, Technical Report GL-
90-2 (1990); Joseph B. Dunbar, Louis D. Britsch, and E. Burton Kemp I1, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, Land Loss Rates: Louisiana Chenwer Plan, Technical Report GL-90-2,
Report 2 at 19 (1990).
56. Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 809, 173 So. 315, 323 (1936), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 700, 58 S. Ct. 19 (1937).
57. State v. Placid Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 15'4 (La. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110,
95 S. Ct. 784 (1975).
58. La. Civ. Code arts. 450, 451.
59. H.B. 538, 539 Reg. Sess. La. (1991). See infra text accompanying notes 65-67.
60. 43 U.S.C. § 982 (1988).
61. See Yiannopoulos Article, supra note 4, at 1362.
62. Id. at 1361.
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part of the swamp and overflowed lands acquired in the federal grants. 6
With regard to navigable waters including the sea and its shores, it
is now settled law that any patents purporting to alienate them are null
and void. This issue was put to rest in Gulf Oil v. State Mineral Board."
With respect to nonnavigable tidelands, which Louisiana acquired as
public trust lands at statehood, the situation is not so clear. Indeed,
Phillips Petroleum has highly sensitized Louisiana's private property
owners and lawmakers to a problem that has been smoldering since the
first sale of swamp and overflowed lands in 1855: namely, what has
been done with the state's nonnavigable tidelands? Phillips was a re-
minder that the question was still unanswered, though undoubtedly many
people in Louisiana were unaware the title to nonnavigable tidelands
was in doubt.
Concern for the security of titles and the fruits of ownership, such
as mineral rights, prompted the introduction of two bills in the 1991
Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature designed to quiet the titles
to nonnavigable tidelands in favor of private owners. House Bill 538
distinguished Louisiana's civil law system of property ownership from
the English common law system and stated that Phillips Petroleum would
not have the same effect in Louisiana as in Mississippi. 6 The bill further
63. John L. Madden, Federal and State Lands in Louisiana 281-84 (1973); Yiannopoulos
Article, supra note 4, at 1361-62. See also Board of Comm'rs for Buras Levee Dist. v. Mt.
Forest Fur Farms of Am., 178 La. 696, 152 So. 497 (1933); State ex rel. Board of Comm'rs
of Buras Levee Dist. v. N.A. Baker & Son, 146 La. 413, 83 So. 693 (1920); State v. Bayou
Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604, 58 So. 405 (1912).
64. 317 So. 2d 576 (La. 1975). For a thorough discussion of the controversy surrounding
this issue see: A.N. Yiannopoulos, Validity of Patents Conveying Navigable Waterbottoms-
Act 62 of 1912, Price, Carter, And All That, 32 La. L. Rev. I (1971) and Yiannopoulos
Treatise, supra note 4, at §§ 66-68. The following is a brief summary:
Sales of land acquired by the state in Swamp Land Grants inadvertently included navigable
waterbottoms which were encompassed within some tracts. When the sales of these public .
trust waterbottoms were later challenged the legislature attempted to cure the private titles
by passing a statute, Act 62 of 1912, which limited the time in which the state could revoke
land patents to six years from the date of the issuance of the patent. Since Louisiana law
at that time prohibited the alienation of navigable waterbottoms, the question arose as to
whether or not Act 62 included, and therefore ratified, the sale of navigable waterbottoms.
In landmark cases the Louisiana Supreme Court held first in California Co. v. Price, 225
La. 706, 74 So. 2d I (1954) that Act 62 did include sales purporting to transfer navigable,
water bodies and therefore ratified the sales of navigable waterbottoms; but then Gulf Oil
v. State Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d 576 (La. 1975) reversed the earlier decision and held
that it did not. The Guff Oil court declined to decide the issue of whether Act 727 of 1954,
which had attempted to legislatively overrule California v. Price, was valid as an interpretative
statute. The court did, however, state that Act 727 would be valid under the holding of
Illinois Central (see infra discussion at notes 77.79). Since the Louisiana Constitution of 1921,
it has been unconstitutional for the State to alienate navigable waterbottoms. So as it stands
in Louisiana today, some public trust waterbottoms may be under private title, but these
titles are revocable under the statutory law and the holding in Guf Oil.
65. H. B. 538, Reg. Sess. La. 1991.
19921
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
provided that waterbottoms other than the sea and its shores and nav-
igable-in-fact water bodies constituted "inland nonnavigable water bod-
ies" which could be privately owned, and that alienation by the state
of land encompassing such inland nonnavigable waterbodies would be
deemed to convey those waterbodies unless specifically reserved by the
state. House Bill 538 applied to lands acquired by the state in any
manner, specifically including lands obtained by the Swamp Land Grant
Acts and under the equal footing doctrine. House Bill 539 proposed to
amend Civil Code article 451 to change the definition of seashore to
"the space of land in the open coast over which the waters of the sea
spread directly in the highest tide during the winter season." 66 Neither
of the bills were passed; instead a compromise was reached between
proponents and opponents which resulted in the passage of House Con-
current Resolution No. 145.67 The resolution directed the Louisiana State
Law Institute to determine the status of Louisiana law regarding "own-
ership of nonnavigable waterbottoms subject to the ebb and flow of
the tide" and what changes if any had been effected by Phillips Pe-
troleum, and to report its findings to a special joint subcommittee of
the legislature by February 1, 1992.
There are several issues that will undoubtedly be considered by the
Louisiana State Law Institute in fulfilling its legislative mandate and by
the legislature if the same or similar legislation is introduced in 1992.
The first question that arises is whether Louisiana's conception of the
public trust doctrine's geographical scope has historically encompassed
nonnavigable tidelands. If these tidelands are recognized to be part of
the sea and its shores, then they have always been insusceptible of
private ownership under the Civil Code. If the Code did not classify
nonnavigable tidelands as seashore, were they insusceptible of private
ownership under some other provision of law, or was there a recognized
public policy to that effect? In either instance, patents purporting to
convey them would be absolutely null under Gulf Oil (discussed below).
The second question that must be answered is whether Louisiana ever
clearly and expressly alienated its nonnavigable tidelands." Thirdly, if
nonnavigable tidelands were alienated, would that action be null or
revocable under Illinois Central and Gulf Oil? The Louisiana legislature
added to the confusion by passing what appears to be imprecise and
ambiguous legislation affecting public trust waterbottoms beginning in
1855 and continuing well into this century. 9 A chronology of this
legislation demonstrates legislative uncertainty in early dealings with
66. H. B. 539, Reg. Sess. La. 1991.
67. H. C. R. 145, 17th Reg. Sess. La. 1991, La. Session Law Service (West).
68. See supra note 39.
69. See the summary of legislative acts affecting public trust waterbottoms in the appendix.
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public trust lands, followed by very definitive statements affirming the
public trust doctrine. As can be seen from the acts authorizing the sale
of land, the terms "swamplands," "overflowed lands," "lands subject
to regular tidal overflow," "lands subject to tidal overflow," "sea
marsh," "prairie," and "lands ... that belong to the state by virtue
of her inherent sovereignty" were all used at one time or another. 0
These words are never clearly defined, and some appear to have been
used interchangeably. In none is the term "ebb and flow of the tide"
used, leaving unanswered the question of the relationship of the terms
"swamp and overflowed lands" to tidelands and seashore and whether
the difference was recognized during that period.'
APPLICABILITY OF GULF OIL TO NONNAVIGABLE TIDELANDS
In finding patents purporting to convey navigable waterbottoms to
private parties absolutely null, and not cured by Act 62 of 1912,72 the
Gulf Oil court never used the term tidelands or nonnavigable tidelands.
Obviously, this could indicate that the case does not apply to tidelands
other than the sea and arms of the sea which the court specifically
included in its holding." However, there is evidence that the Gulf Oil
court contemplated nonnavigable tidelands within the scope of its hold-
ing. First, the court established that navigable waterbottoms other than
rivers were inalienable and cited in support three cases which had stated
tidelands were within the public trust, independent of finding them to
be navigable.7 4 Thus, the implication is that all tidelands are considered
to be included in the term navigable waters. Second, the Gulf Oil court
cited the Oyster Statutes as indicative of the long-standing public policy
against alienation of navigable waterbottoms. 75 But, as will be shown,
the Oyster Statutes have never been limited to navigable waters. The
court either misstated the scope of the Oyster Statutes or considered
the waterbottoms covered by them, including nonnavigable tidelands, to
be within the conception of navigability for public trust purposes. Third,
the court analyzed the intent of Act 75 of 1880, which authorized the
70. Id.
71. Yiannopoulos Article, supra note 4, at 1361; Yiannopoulos Treatise, supra note 4,
at §§ 66 & 73.
72. See supra note 64.
73. Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d. 576, 582-83 (1975).
74. State ex. rel. Board of Comm'rs of Atchafalaya Basin Levee District v. Capdeville,
146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919), cert. denied, 252 U.S. 581, 40 S. Ct. 346 (1920) (see infra
discussion at notes 106, 107); State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604, 58 So. 405
(1912) (see discussion at notes 108, 109); Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Comm'n of
Louisiana, 125 La. 740, 51 So. 706 (1910) (see discussion at notes 110-13).
75. Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d. 576, 583 (La. 1975); 1880 La.
Acts No. 75.
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sale of sea marsh or prairie subject to tidal overflow acquired in the
1849 and 1850 federal grants:
Moreover, in formulating Act No. 75 of 1880, the legislature
did not enunciate as specific a recognition of public policy as
it had in the two previous statutes, but it did exercise extreme
caution in providing that the lands it authorized to be sold were
only those received by the State under the Swamp Land Acts
of 1849 and 1850. This specific restriction evinces an intent to
make certain that inalienable water beds were excluded, in rec-
ognition of the public policy emanating from the Civil Code.7 6
More simply, only those lands acquired by the state through the
Swamp Land Grant Acts could be sold by the state's acts purporting
to convey the same lands to private parties. Nonnavigable tidelands did
not belong to the state by virtue of the Swamp Land Grant Acts, but
by virtue of inherent sovereignty and "equal footing.""17 Therefore, under
the Gulf Oil court's analysis of Act 75 of 1880, nonnavigable tidelands
were not within the Swamp Land Grant Acts and thus could be con-
sidered inalienable waterbeds. Fourth, the court analyzed Act 727 of
1954.71 Section 3 of Act 727 prohibits statutes from being construed as
conveying navigable or tide waters.' 9 Without so holding, the court stated
that Act 727 would be valid under the public trust doctrine as enunciated
in Illinois Central.80 The court was thus citing with approval a statute
which includes tide waters in the public trust.
Finally, the court in Gulf Oil discussed the importance of the public
trust doctrine in shaping public policy regarding the treatment of nav-
igable waterbottoms. The court stated that the public trust doctrine
could, on its own, be dispositive of the case before it.8 The court then
reiterated that by virtue of their inherent sovereignity and under the
equal footing doctrine, states acquired navigable water bodies in public
trust, and that Illinois Central prohibits a state's abdication of its "trust
over property in which the people as a whole are interested so as to
leave it entirely under the use and control of private parties.""Bz While
the court spoke in terms of navigable waters, the public trust doctrine
on which it based its argument is not limited to navigable waters, but
encompasses land under tide waters whether or not navigable. This is
obvious from the federal pronouncements of the public trust doctrine,
76. Guff Oil, 317 So. 2d at 583 (emphasis added).
77. See supra discussion of Phillips Petroleum at notes 18, 19.
78. Gulf Oil, 317 So. 2d at 590-91.
79. Id. at 590; 1954 La. Acts No. 727, § 3.
80. Gulf Oil, 317 So. 2d at 591.
81. Id. at 589.
82. Id.
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of which Illinois Central is a part."3 Additionally, nonnavigable tidelands
are certainly property in which the people as a whole are interested,
especially in light of their natural resources and fisheries production
values." The natural resources value of tidelands has become more
apparent with increasing scientific knowledge, but the passage of the
1886 oyster statute indicates an existing recognition of the importance
of tidelands to all the people of the state.8" Given the fact that the
court in Gulf Oil relied on federal pronouncements of the public trust
doctrine, which include nonnavigable tidelands, and the fact that non-
navigable tidelands are property in which the people as a whole are
interested, nonnavigable tidelands can reasonably be considered to have
been encompassed within the scope of the holding.
Together, all of the points just stated argue for applying the holding
in Gulf Oil to nonnavigable tidelands. This argument is especially com-
pelling in light of public policy, which has come to recognize intertidal
areas as invaluable to all citizens of the state for their ecological and
economic importance.
WHICH TIDELANDS ARE SEASHORE?
Official comment (b) to the 1978 revision of Louisiana Civil Code
article 451 states that Louisiana jurisprudence has limited the definition
of seashore to "the space of land in the open coast that is directly
overflown by the tides.""6 Other cases have used this language, first set
83. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988); Shively
v, Bowlby, 152 U.S. I, 14 S. Ct. 548 (1894).
84. Herke, Knudsen, Knudsen & Rogers. Effect of Semi-impoundment on Fish and
Crustacean Nursery Use and Export, North American Journal of Fisheries Management (in
press); William H. Herke and Barton D. Rogers, Comprehensive Estuarine Nursery Study
Completed, 9 Fisheries, No. 6 (1984); William H. Herke, Use of Natural, and Semi-Impounded,
Louisiana Tidal Marshes as Nurseries for Fishes and Crustaceans, Ph. D. dissertation, Louisiana
State University (1971); U.S. Dept. of the Interior, A Study of Marsh Management Practice
in Coastal Louisiana, OCS Study, MMS 90-0076 vol. 11, 66-68, 72-76 (1990); Thomas J.
Minello and Roger J. Zimmerman, Fish Predation on Juvenile Brown Shrimp, Penaeus
aztecus, Ives: The Effect of Simulated Spartina Structure on Predation Rates, 72 J. Exp.
Mar. Biol. Ecol. 211 (1983); Roger J. Zimmerman and Thomas J. Minello, Densities of
Penaeus aztecus, Penaeus set ferus, and other Natant Macrofauna in a Texas Salt Marsh, 7
Estuaries 421 (1984); Roger J. Zimmerman, Thomas J. Minello, and Gilbert Zamora, Jr.,
Selection of Vegetated Habitat by Brown Shrimp, Penaeus aztecus, in a Galveston Bay Salt
Marsh, 82 (2) Fishery Bulletin 325-36 (1984).
85. 1886 La. Acts 106; see infra discussion at note 116.
86. La. Civ. Code art. 451, comment (b): "According to Louisiana decisions seashore
is the space of land in the open coast that is directly overflown [sic) by the tides. See Burns
v. Salinovich, 154 La. 495, 97 So. 748 (1923); Morgan v. Negodich, 40 La. Ann. 246, 3
So. 636 (1887). See also Burns v. Crescent Gun & Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So. 249
(1906). Thus, not all lands subject to tidal overflow are 'seashore."'
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forth in Morgan, to define seashore.8" However, the jurisprudence in-
terpreting Article 451's reference to seashore is not as determinative or
consistent as the official comment to the article indicates. At least one
eminent legal scholar on Louisiana property law has questioned the
effect of Morgan and Buras on the scope of Louisiana's public trust
doctrine. 8 A close examination of these decisions shows why. The earliest
case, Morgan (decided in 1887), appears to rest on a poor understanding
of the facts relating to the physical processes affecting the disputed
water body, Bayou Cook, which is about three miles from the open
coast to the south and about three miles from the Mississippi River to
the north. Bayou Cook, apparently a navigable-in-fact bayou (two "acres"
wide and twenty feet deep), connected two bays, one considered by the
court to be an arm of the sea. The court made several statements
regarding the hydrology of Bayou Cook:
He avers that this property is subject to tidal overflow .... 89;
* . .Some water passes into it [Bayou Cook] from the Mississippi
river, through small bayous, and an adjacent swamp; and some
salt water comes into it by way of Bay Bastian, from the gulf.
This commixture of fresh and salt water is decidedly brackish. 9°
... The proof does not clearly show the extent to which the
ebb and flow of the tides of the gulf affect those lands on the
shores of Bayou Cook, or whether or not the oyster beds of
the defendants are, at any time, bared by the ebb-tide. Evidently
the salt water found in Bayou Cook does not result from the
overflow occasioned by the high tides flooding its banks; it
enters Bay Bastian, in the first instance, and thence passes into
Bayou Cook. The salt water thus supplied, combined with the
accumulation of fresh water derived from the Mississippi river,
floods the banks of Bayou Cook and passes into the adjacent
marsh, to be returned again to the gulf, when the tide is low .... 9,
... The salt water ascertained to be in Bayou Cook, is not
supplied by a "water-flood" from the gulf; nor do "the waters
of the sea (gulf) spread, in the highest water, during the winter
season," over its banks .... 91
87. Davis Oil Co. v. Citrus Land Co., 576 So. 2d 495 (La. 1991); State v. Erwin, 173
La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931); State v. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co., 164 La. 240, 113 So.
833 (1927).
88. Yiannopoulos Article, supra note 4, at 1364; Yiannopoulos Treatise, supra note 4,
at § 73.
89. Morgan v. Negodich, 40 La. Ann. 246, 247, 3 So. 636, 637 (La. 1887).
90. Id. at 251, 3 So. at 639.
91. Id., 3 So. at 639.
92. Id. at 252, 3 So. at 640.
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Several things are confusing about the language in Morgan, which raises
questions as to whether the physical nature of the area in dispute
constituted tidelands under the public trust doctrine and Phillips and as
to the court's level of knowledge regarding Bayou Cook:
(1) Was Bayou Cook affected by daily ebb and flow from
astronomically driven tides or was it tidally overflowed peri-
odically by wind driven water, especially during storms? Or, was
Bayou Cook primarily overflowed by flood water from the
Mississippi River?
(2) Did the court consider Bayou Cook to be affected by daily
(astronomical) ebb and flow or by other sources of overflow?
(3) Did the court understand the difference between daily ebb
and flow, tidal overflow, and other flooding so common in the
Louisiana coastal area?
(4) What was the significance of using salinity to characterize
the water in Bayou Cook?
(5) Finally, Morgan was decided in 1887, one year after the
1886 Oyster Statute93 had asserted state ownership to water bodies
bordering on the coast. Bayou Cook was a navigable water body
and therefore inalienable. Morgan was not a possessory or pe-
titory action, but decided the exclusive right to use the disputed
waterbottoms for the cultivation of oysters. 4 In that context,
did the court intend to establish a sweeping rule of property
ownership along Louisiana's coast or was it merely establishing
who had the right to harvest oysters in this particular case?
Buras followed the holding in Morgan, but again the facts are
unclear. The land, bordering on the Mississippi River 85 miles south of
New Orleans, is described as being "subject to tidal overflow, and not
fit for cultivation. '"91 In finding the plaintiff's land not to be seashore,
the court stated:
The waters of the Gulf of Mexico, or the bays or coves behind
plaintiff's land, do not "spread" upon it, during the ordinary
high tides, or in the highwater seasons. The tide waters back
up into the coves behind the land, and cause the bayous in the
land to rise and spread over most of the area.96
Nowhere in the decision is there any mention of the land being subject
to the ebb and flow of the tide. It sounds as if the lands in question
were marsh lands above high tide and therefore not tidelands. Thus,
93. 1886 La. Acts No. 106.
94. Morgan, 40 La. Ann. at 247, 3 So. at 637.
95. Buras v. Salinovich, 154 La. 495, 97 So. 748 (La. 1923).
96. Id. at 500, 97 So. at 750.
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Buras cannot really stand for excluding tidelands that are not on the
open coast from the definition of seashore.
In Burns' a bayou and lagoon connected to the shores of Lake
Pontchartrain were held not to be arms of the sea even though they
were affected by the ebb and flow of the tides. These lands would
probably qualify as Phillips-type tidelands. The court again seemed to
attempt to use salinity as a determining factor for one of the water
bodies:
It has no channel, and its waters are not the same as those of
the lake; for in it are found the fresh-water fish to which we
have before referred .... It is not navigable, nor can it be
considered a part of Lake Pontchartrain or any part of its
shores. It is a container of fresh water and, while it may be
affected by the ebb and flow from the lake, it is not a salt-
water pond or lake. 98
A salinity test is confusing, especially in light of the fact that Lake
Pontchartrain, which has been found to be an arm of the sea, 99 is very
often essentially fresh, depending on the season. In finding Bayou Cas-
tiglione not to be a part of an arm of the sea, the court cited French
and Spanish authority'00 but curiously did not cite Morgan.
In the Sweet Lake'0' decision, the court decided that Sweet Lake,
located fifteen miles from the Gulf, was not within the tidewaters of
the sea. However, this lake was described as "an isolated body of rain
water in the midst of a dense sea marsh, without a natural inlet or
outlet large enough for a pirogue to navigate."' 02 No mention is made
of tidal influence, and even though Morgan is cited in support of the
decision, these were apparently not tidelands like those considered under
the holding in Phillips.
In State v. Erwin,03 Calcasieu Lake, a usually fresh lake "affected
more or less by the tides, especially at the southern end,"104 was found
not to be an arm of the sea. The court quoted Morgan and Buras as
authority for its decision. This case arose when riparian land owners
challenged the state's ownership of a portion of the lake bed which had
once comprised their property but had been lost by erosion of the lake's
shores. The original decision dealt with whether Calcasieu Lake was a
97. Burns v. Crescent Gun & Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So. 249 (1906).
98. Id. at 1042, 41 So. at 251.
99. Zeller v. Southern Yacht Club. 34 La. Ann. 837 (1882).
100. Burns, 116 La. at 1043, 41 So. at 251, quoting Laurent, Baudry, and Dalloz.
101. State v. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co., 164 La. 240, 113 So. 833 (1927).
102. Id. at 147, 113 So. at 836.
103. 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931).
104. Id. at 510, 133 So. at 85.
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lake or a river, whether the laws of accretion and dereliction applied
to lakes, and whether erosion on a navigable lake's shores vested state
ownership in the new lakebed areas. When the state lost its ownership
argument, it contended the lake was an arm of the sea, and the court
decided on rehearing that Calcasieu Lake is not an arm of the sea. The
geography of Calcasieu Lake would seem to limit the effect of this
decision as an interpretation of seashore. The lake is at least five miles
from the Gulf, and its outlet is very restricted. It is of a very different
character from many of the areas in question. Still, it appears to qualify
as Phillips-type tidelands. It is significant, however, that the court was
not placed in the position of deciding between state and private ownership
of the original bed since the lake is navigable, but had to decide only
ownership of the eroded areas.
Davis Oil Co. v. Citrus Land Co.105 followed the interpretation of
seashore in Morgan and Buras. However, even though these two cases
are cited as supporting the finding of a seashore, there are two points
that weaken the proposition that seashore is limited to the open coast
directly overflowed by the tides. First, Davis found that Little Bay is
directly overflowed by the Gulf tide, so this positive finding sheds little
light on what is not seashore. Second, and more importantly, an ex-
amination of the area in question reveals that it lies at least in part
behind other land masses. So, in that situation, what does "directly
overflowed" mean? Additionally, the court's finding has the effect of
expanding the public trust, so it cannot be used as an example of a
restriction of that trust.
There are other Louisiana Supreme Court decisions which used ebb
and flow of the tides as the determinant of state ownership without
requiring the lands in question to be on the open coast or directly
overflowed by the tides. The ownership of four lakes ranging in depth
from three inches to over nine feet was under dispute in State ex rel
Board of Commissioners of Atchafalaya Basin Levee District v. Capde-
vile. o The lakes had been encompassed in the Federal Swamp Land
Grants of 1849 and 1850, and the question arose as to whether the
state had alienated them when it sold the surrounding tracts to private
parties. The court found that at least portions of three lakes were
navigable year-round, one was navigable in high water, and all were
subject to the regular ebb and flow of the tides. In holding that the
state still held title to the waterbottoms, the court used as part of its
argument the fact that the waters of the lakes were within the tidewaters
of the sea:
105. 576 So. 2d 495 (La. 1991).
106. 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919).
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Neither do the beds of streams, lakes, etc., within the ti-
dewaters of the sea belong to the United States, but, for the
reasons just stated, are the property of the state.
Consequently, no property which fell within either category,
that is, the beds of navigable streams, lakes, etc., or those within
the tidewaters of the sea, ever came under the operation of the
Swamp Land Acts. All of the lakes, whose beds are involved
in this case (with the possible exception of Little Lake Long),
according to the record, are navigable (at least portions thereof)
the whole year round, by small craft, and in high-water seasons
all are navigable to steamboats, and are so used. They are all
also shown to be within the ebb and flow of the tides. It follows
that they were not included in the swamp and overflowed lands
granted by Congress to the state, and by the latter transferred
to the Atchafalaya Basin levee district. 07
The bodies of water in question were at least fifteen miles from
the shores of the open coast, yet the court found they were in the
tidewaters of the sea. Such a determination was probably not necessary.
Although there was doubt as to the navigability of one, the court found
the lakes to have been navigable. The court appears to have used the
tidewaters of the sea determination as an alternative or additional ar-
gument to bolster its decision. In any event, State v. Capdeville does
not support the proposition that Louisiana jurisprudence has consistently
defined seashore as lands in the open coast which are directly overflowed
by the tides.
State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co. 101 decided the character of several
bodies of water ranging in depth from two-and-a-half to twelve feet
and as much as two-and-a-half to three miles from the shores of Lake
Borgne. After determining that 'the water bodies were tidelands and
therefore not included in the Swamp Land Grants of 1849 and 1850,
the court stated:
the conveyance to Sanger was nevertheless a conveyance of public
lands which the state held for sale, and did not purport to be
a conveyance of navigable and tide waters and waterbottoms,
which the state was holding in trust for all of her citizens.
It may be, and probably is, true that there is no legal
impediment in the way of the state's alienating such property
in favor of particular individuals or corporations, save in so far
as such alienations might conflict with the power vested in
Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce; but, as
107. Id. at 107, 83 So. at 425 (emphasis added).
108. 130 La. 604, 58 So. 405 (1912). See also infra text accompanying notes 146-48.
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we have already seen, her declared policy has always been not
to do so, and any statute or contract from which such effect
were claimed would, necessarily, be strictly construed against the
grantee.109
In Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission of Louisiana,I" 0
a dispute arose between the state and private owners of land in St.
Bernard Parish adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico over ownership of
waterbottoms encompassed by the plaintiff's property. The private claim-
ants traced their title to the Swamp Land Grants. Several of these
waterbottoms were bayous and coves that were sheltered from the "di-
rect" (if the word is given its literal meaning) influence of the tides,
but subject to the ebb and flow of the tides. In other words, there was
not a direct path for the water to flow from the open Gulf, but tides
still rose and fell in the water bodies. The court did not know if the
passes were navigable-in-fact. The court found that there may be "non-
navigable streams, pools, ponds, and wet places, so insignificant in
dimensions and so within the borders of the dry land covered by plain-
tiff's grants as that plaintiff would be entitled to hold them, as included
therein.""' The waters the court described, being within the borders of
dry land, would not have been subject to the daily ebb and flow of
the tides, but with respect to the tidally-influenced waterbottoms in
question the court said:
Hence, there can be no such thing in this state as private
ownership of the bed of a navigable river, and a fortiori can
there be no such thing as private ownership of the bed of the
sea or of an arm of the sea. .... .2
We conclude, then, that the grants under which plaintiff
claims-being of land bordering upon, and partially surrounded
by, the tide water of the Gulf of Mexico-carry its titles no
farther than high-water mark, and that, in so far as it (plaintiff)
asserts ownership and possession, under such titles, of land lying
beneath the waters which surround the tracts of dry land included
in said grants, or, lying beneath any navigable passes, or chan-
nels, which intersect such tracts or separate them from each
other, the exception, of no cause of action, was properly main-
tained." 3
Therefore, without a finding that they were navigable-in-fact, these
waterbottoms were found to constitute the bed of the sea or arms of
109. Id. at 68, 58 So. at 410 (emphasis added).
110. 125 La. 740, 51 So. 706 (1910).
111. *Id. at 755, 51 So. at 712 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 754, 51 So. at 711.
113. Id. at 755, 51 So. at 711-12.
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the sea, even though they were not "directly" overflowed by the tides.
The foregoing analysis indicates the jurisprudence of this state has
not necessarily been consistent 'in its interpretation of seashore; thus
there is not jurisprudence constante on this issue.' 14 Therefore, the
proposed legislation very possibly does not constitute an interpretation
or a clarification of the law, but is a redefinition-one that could divest
the state's public trust of hundreds of thousands of acres (or more) of
intertidal waterbottoms.
HAS LOUISIANA EXPRESSED A PUBLIC POLICY THAT INCLUDES
NONNAVIGABLE TIDELANDS IN THE PUBLIC TRUST?
Besides the possibility that nonnavigable tidelands could be recog-
nized as part of the sea or seashore under Civil Code article 451, what
other public policies has Louisiana expressed in its management of these
waterbottoms? Statutes affecting nonnavigable tidelands can be cate-
gorized into those authorizing the sale of state-owned land and those
asserting state ownership."' Those acts authorizing the sale of state lands
will be discussed in the following section. In this section we will examine
statutes asserting state ownership to public trust waterbottoms.
In 1870 the legislature passed the first of a series of acts commonly
referred to as "Oyster Statutes." ' These statutes dealt with the reg-
ulation and development of Louisiana's oyster industry and, beginning
with Act 106 of 1886, each contains a clause which we will term a
"state ownership clause" substantially similar in substance. For example,
Act 106 of 1886 contains the following language:
114. For discussions of the use of judicial precedents as a source of law in Louisiana
see Albert Tate, Jr., Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in Louisiana, 22 La. L. Rev. 727
(1962); William T. Tete, The Code, Custom and the Courts: Notes Toward a Louisiana
Theory of Precedent, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (1973); A. N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Law System
Coursebook Part I § 35 (1977); and Yiannopoulos Treatise, supra note 4, at § 73. In Miami
Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 802, 317 So. 2d 576, 173 So. 315, 320 (1936), the court stated:
"In Louisiana, this court has never hesitated to overrule a line of decisions where they
establish a rule of property when greater harm would result from perpetuating the error than
from correcting." In Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d 576, 591 (La. 1975),
the court, citing with approval the above quote from Miami Corp., stated: "The so-called
rule of property has little or no validity in this civilian jurisdiction. That concept stems from
the theory of stare decisis, is founded entirely upon common law, and finds no basis in our
Civil Code, or in our statutory law. Stability in' the law and constancy of jurisprudence are
undoubtedly objects to be constantly sought. However, when it is necessary to overrule a
short line of clearly erroneous jurisprudence in order to reinstate the long-standing law and
public policy of this State, that course is clearly the one that must be followed." In these
situations, the Louisiana Supreme Court has overruled prior decisions -affecting property rights
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Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State
of Louisiana, That all the beds of the rivers, bayous, creeks,
lakes, coves, inlets and sea marshes bordering on the Gulf of
Mexico, and all that part of the Gulf of Mexico within the
jurisdiction of this State, and not heretofore sold or conveyed
by special grants or by sale by this State, or by the United
States to any private party or parties, shall continue and remain
the property of the State of Louisiana, and may be used as a
common by all the people of the State for the purposes of
fishing and of taking and catching oysters and other shell fish,
subject to the reservations and restrictions hereinafter imposed,
and no grant or sale, or conveyance shall hereafter be made by
the Register of the State Land office to any estate, or interest
of the State in any natural oyster bed or shoal, whether the
said bed or shoal shall ebb bare or not (emphasis added)." '
Act 106 also provided that riparian land owners adjoining rivers, bays,
lakes, bayous, coves, inlets, or passes would have the exclusive right to
use waterbottoms comprised within the boundaries of their land for
oyster cultivation." 8 Other riparian owners were given the right to use
the water bodies to the low-water mark for oyster cultivation.
Act 110 of 1892, which repealed Act 106 of 1886, read as follows:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State
of Louisiana. That all the beds of the rivers, bayous, creeks,
lakes, coves, and inlets, bordering on the Gulf of Mexico, and
all that part of the Gulf of Mexico within the jurisdiction of
this State, shall continue and remain the property of the State
of Louisiana, and may be used as a common by all citizens of
the State for the purposes of fishing and taking and catching
oysters and other shell fish subject to the reservations and res-
trictions hereinafter imposed and no grant or sale or conveyance
shall hereafter be made by the Register of the State Land Office
to any estate, or interest of the State, in any natural oyster bed
or shoal, whether the said bed or shoal shall ebb bare or not;
and the citizens, of this State shall have the exclusive privilege
to fish or take oysters in any natural oyster bed or shoal subject
to the restrictions hereinafter imposed." 9
Act 110 of 1892 deleted from the previous enactment (Act 106 of 1886)
the phrases "sea marshes" and "and not heretofore sold or conveyed
by special grants or by sale by this State, or by the United States to
117. 1886 La. Acts No. 106, § 1.
118. 1886 La. Acts No. 106, § 2.
119. 1892 La. Acts No. 110, § 1.
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any private party or parties." These changes were continued in the 1896
enactment.'20 In Act 153 of 1902, the phrase "bordering on the Gulf
of Mexico" was changed to read "bordering on or connecting with the
Gulf of Mexico," and the clause remained essentially unchanged in
successive Oyster Statutes.'21
Of course, it could be concluded that the language in the first Oyster
Statute "not heretofore sold or conveyed by special grants or by sale
by this State, or by the United States to any private party or parties,"
evinces a recognition that nonnavigable tidelands could be alienated prior
to enactment of the statute. Just as logical a conclusion is that this
language refers to those waterbottoms susceptible of being alienated,
i.e., nonnavigable and non-tidally-influenced waterbottoms. Additionally,
since all tidelands came to the state by virtue of her inherent sovereignty,
how could the United States have sold them? This phrase did not appear
in any subsequent enactments.
In 1904, Act 52 added a provision prohibiting anyone from owning
in fee simple the bottoms of navigable waters.'2 The use of the term
"navigable" raises the question of whether the statute intended to in-
dicate by negative implication that nonnavigable tidelands were suscep-
tible of private ownership in fee simple. Three facts mitigate against
such an interpretation. First, Section 1 of Act 52 (and all subsequent
enactments) asserted state ownership to all the enumerated water bodies
bordering on or connecting to the Gulf of Mexico. Second, reenactments
in 1906 and 1908 left this provision intact but described it as prohibiting
the alienation in fee simple of "the bottom or beds of the bodies or
streams of water along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, and the waters
of the Gulf of Mexico within the jurisdiction of the State of Louis-
iana."' 2 There is no description of the water bodies or streams being
navigable. Third, Act 189 of 1910 repealed the previous Oyster Statutes
and prohibited anyone from owning in fee simple any waterbottoms
described therein'2 (i.e., "rivers, bayous, lagoons, lakes, bays, sounds,
and inlets bordering on or connecting with the Gulf of Mexico within
the jurisdiction of the State of Louisiana").
The Oyster Statutes indicate a strong public policy to include non-
navigable tidelands in the state's public trust. Whether such a policy
existed prior to 1886 independent of the Civil Code provision regarding
the sea and its shores cannot be conclusively proven. However, a logical
conclusion is that by enacting the Oyster Statutes, the legislature was
120. 1896 La. Acts No. 121, § 1.
121. 1902 La. Acts No. 153, § I (emphasis added); see Appendix for later Oyster Statutes.
122. 1904 La. Acts No. 52, § 2.
123. 1906 La. Acts No. 178, § 1; 1908 La. Acts No. 167, preamble.
124. 1910 La. Acts No. 189, § 2.
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merely clarifying and strengthening preexisting public policy which in-
cluded nonnavigable tidelands in the public trust. The Louisiana Supreme
Court recognized such a policy in State v. Capdeville and State v. Bayou
Johnson Oyster Co.125
At least one lower court case has limited the scope of the Oyster
Statutes to areas bordering on, or connecting with, the Gulf where
oysters can be cultivated.' 26 This court of appeal decision dealt with
waterbottoms more than 50 miles from the Gulf and, therefore, would
not seem to have much effect as precedent. Additionally, oysters are
known to occur in a great range of salinities,' 7 so even if there were
such a limitation, it would still encompass waterbottoms a substantial
distance from the open coast.' s2 Finally, the court in Gulf Oil recognized
no such limitation when it cited the Oyster Statutes as an example of
public policy regarding navigable water bodies.
Besides the Oyster Statutes, other legislative enactments have re-
flected a strong public policy toward including nonnavigable tidelands
within the public trust (see Appendix). For example, Act 258 of 1910
declared that:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State
of Louisiana, that the waters of and in all bayous, lagoons,
lakes and bays and the beds thereof, within the borders of the
State not at present under the direct ownership of any person,
firm, or corporation are hereby declared to be the property of
the State. There shall never by any charge assessed against any
person, firm or corporation for the use of the waters of the
State for municipal, agricultural or domestic purposes. 29
This Act applied to all waters-navigable, nonnavigable, tidal, and non-
tidal. Consequently, as with the Oyster Statutes, the phrase "not at
present under the direct ownership" does not necessarily attempt to
ratify alienation of navigable or tidal water bodies. Just as logically, it
could merely be ratifying the sale of alienable waterbottoms. In 1912
the legislature enacted the now-famous Act 62 which limited the period
for challenging validity of a state land patent to six years from date
of issuance.' 30 In 1921, the constitution was amended to read,
125. See supra text accompanying notes 106-09.
126. Sinclair Oil and Gas Co. v. Delacroix Corp., 285 So. 2d 845, 854 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1973).
127. Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission, The Oyster Fishery of the Gulf of Mexico,
United States, March 1991, at 5-16.
128. See, for example, Center for Wetland Resources, Barataria Basin: Salinity Changes
and Oyster Distribution, Sea Grant Publication No. LSU-T-76-004 at 30-33, 47-50 (1976).
129. 1910 La. Acts No. 258, § 1; La. R.S. 9:1101 (1991).
130. La. R.S. 9:5661 (1991); see supra text accompanying note 64.
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Nor shall the Legislature alienate or authorize the alienation of
the fee of the bed of any navigable stream, lake or other body
of water except for purposes of reclamation.' 31
In 1938, Act 55 was enacted "[tlo declare the sovereignty of Louis-
iana along its seacoast and to fix its present seacoast boundary and
ownership."'3 2 Section 3 of that act stated:
Section 3. That the State of Louisiana owns in full and complete
ownership the waters of the Gulf of Mexico and of the arms
of the said Gulf and the beds and shores of the Gulf of Mexico
and the arms of the Gulf of Mexico, including all lands that
are covered by the waters of the said Gulf and its arms either
at low tide or high tide, within the boundaries of Louisiana,
as herein fixed.'
Act 727 of 1954, an attempt to legislatively overrule the Price line
of cases,'3 4 states in part that no statute shall be construed to validate
the transfer of "navigable or tide waters or the beds of same."' 35 The
court in Gulf Oil discussed this statute and, without holding so, strongly
suggested that it is interpretative legislation. Because it was not necessary
for its holding, the court did not decide the constitutionality of the Act,
but stated that it would be valid anyway under the public trust doctrine
as enunciated in Illinois Central.3 6 In the same year (1954), Act 443
amended Act 258 of 1910 by rescinding and revoking purported con-
veyances of navigable waters and their beds.' 3" The 1974 Louisiana
Constitution continued the prohibition against alienation of navigable
water bodies except for reclamation purposes."' 8 Act 645 of 1978 pro-
claimed that the beds and bottoms of all navigable waters and banks
or shores of bays, arms of the sea, the Gulf of Mexico and navigable
lakes belong to the state and are public lands to be protected and
conserved for public navigation, fishery, recreation, and other interests.1'9
Act 645 also allows riparian land owners to reclaim land lost through
erosion. 4 Finally, Act 876 of 1985 prohibits alienation of the "bottoms
of rivers, streams, bayous, lagoons, lakes, bays, sounds and inlets bor-
dering on or connecting with the Gulf of Mexico . .. except pursuant
131. La. Const. of 1921 art. IV, § 2 (superseded 1974).
132. 1938 La. Acts No. 55, preamble.
133. 1938 La. Acts No. 55, § 3.
134. See supra note 64.
135. 1954 La. Acts No. 727, § 3 (La. R.S. 9:1107.1109 (1991)) (emphasis added),
136. Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d 576, 590-91 (La. 1975).
137. 1954 La. Acts No. 443 § I (La. R.S. 9:1101 (1991)).
138. La. Const. art. IX, § 3.
139. La. R.S. 41:1701.1714 (1990).
140. La. R.S. 41:1702 (1990).
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to R.S. 41:1701-1714" and states that "[nmo one shall own in fee simple
any bottoms of lands covering the bottoms of waters described in this
Section."'41 Again, there is no stipulation that the water bodies must
be navigable. Although Act 876 contains state ownership language iden-
tical to that of previous Oyster Statutes, it is not an Oyster Statute,
but is contained in the public lands section of the Revised Statutes. The
current enactment of the Oyster Statutes is found at Louisiana Revised
Statutes 56:3.
The point of this detailed and somewhat tedious analysis of statutory
language is to demonstrate a consistent pattern in Louisiana's treatment
of its nonnavigable tidelands. All of these statutes taken together present
a strong argument that the state has recognized a public trust encom-
passing nonnavigable tidelands.
HAS LouISIANA EXPRESSLY ALIENATED HER NONNAVIGABLE TIDELANDS?
We have already discussed why Gulf Oil can reasonably be applied
to nonnavigable tidelands, and that the case affirmatively applies federal
restrictions on alienation of public trust lands as set forth in Illinois
Central.142 Gulf Oil also established the requirement that alienations of
navigable waters be express and specific:
It is now clearly manifested by the La. Constitution of 1921,
Art. IV, § 2, and the La. Constitution of 1974, Art. IX, § 3,
that the State can never divest itself of its navigable waterbottoms
except through authority of the people themselves. We hold, for
pre-constitutional purposes that because the beds of navigable
waters of Louisiana are held in "public domain" for the people
of the State, that at the very least (if at all possible) "* * *
[any alienation or grant of the title to navigable waters by the
legislature must be express and specific and is never implied or
presumed from general language in a grant or statute. * * *""
The requirement for express language when alienating navigable waters
should apply equally to other waterbottoms acquired by virtue of inherent
sovereignty and held in public trust. Nonnavigable tidelands were placed
in Louisiana's public trust along with navigable rivers at statehood. Just
as there is a strong public interest in navigable rivers, so is there such
an interest in nonnavigable tidelands. Indeed, the now widely recognized
natural resource and environmental value of nonnavigable tidelands argue
141. La. R.S. 41:14 (1990).
142. See supra discussions at notes 72-85 and 136.
143. Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d 576, 589 (La. 1975).
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a fortiori that the requirement for express language when alienating
public trust lands be applied to them.'4
There is little conclusive evidence that the legislature has ever ex-
pressly and specifically alienated Louisiana's nonnavigable tidelands. The
legislature has created confusion in enacting legislation affecting these
tidelands that does not satisfy the requirements of the public trust
doctrine and Gulf Oil for express and specific language. An illustrative
list and summary of the acts we have found that relate to the disposition
of the tidelands in question is provided in the Appendix. The legislature
used several terms to describe the land the state was selling or granting
without ever clearly defining the terms. The various acts described the
land as "swamplands," "overflowed lands," "lands subject to regular
tidal overflow," "lands subject to tidal overflow," "sea marsh," "prai-
rie," and "lands that belong to the state by virtue of her inherent
sovereignty," but never describe lands subject to the ebb and flow of
the tides. Whether the legislature perceived a difference between swamp
and overflowed lands and lands subject to the ebb and flow of the
tides is very difficult to fathom from these acts.
Several cases have interpreted the acts authorizing the sale of swamp
and overflowed lands donated by Congress-usually in an attempt to
determine whether the legislature intended to and did sell along with
those lands waterbottoms, such as nonnavigable tidelands acquired through
inherent sovereignty. In Chauvin v. Louisiana Oyster Commission4 1 a
dispute arose between the Oyster Commission and a private party over
the ownership of a waterbottom. The court held (in part) that the state
was estopped to deny that Bay Crocodile, a nonnavigable saltwater bay
subject to the ebb and flow of the tides, had been included in the sale
of Federal Swamp Land Grant lands to a private party. However, in
this case, the Oyster Commission was the party asserting the invalidity
of the patent, and on rehearing the court affirmed the judgment on
the ground that the Oyster Commission was not the proper representative
of the state to assail the patent. The court did not again mention that
the state would be estopped to deny that the patent had transferred
Bay Crocodile, so the case cannot with any certainty stand for that
proposition.
Other Louisiana decisions have held that tidelands did not come
into state ownership via the Swamp Land Grants but were already state-
owned, being acquired by virtue of inherent sovereignty at statehood
and, therefore, not alienated with Swamp Land Grant sales.
144. There has also been established a federal requirement for specific and express language
when alienating public trust lands (see supra note 39).
145. 121 La. 10, 46 So. 38 (1907), on reh'g (1908).
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This view was supported by. the court in State v. Bayou Johnson
Oyster Co.,'46 which was a dispute over tidally influenced water bodies
ranging in depth from two-and-a-half to twelve feet and as much as
two-and-a-half to three miles from the shores of Lake Borgne. The'
defendant claimed title derived from Swamp Land Grant sales, but the
court said:
It is evident, then, that the state of Louisiana did not acquire
the soil here claimed, which lies beneath the waters of inter-
communicating sounds, bayous, creeks, channels, lakes, bays,
coves, and inlets, bordering upon the Gulf of Mexico and within
the ebb and flow of the tide, by virtue of the acts of Congress
of 1849 and 1850, but that she acquired them, upon her ad-
mission into the Union, by virtue of her inherent sovereignty. 4
The court in Bayou Johnson went on to say that it had always been
the declared policy of the state not to alienate such waterbottoms. 4s
In State v. Capdeville,149 the court decided the ownership of lakes
at least fifteen miles from the Gulf that had been encompassed in the
Federal Swamp Land Grant Acts of 1849 and 1850, and the question
arose as to whether the state had alienated them when it sold the
surrounding tracts to private parties. The court found that at least
portions of three lakes were navigable year round, one was navigable
in high water, and all were subject to the regular ebb and flow of the
tides. 10 In holding that the state still held title to the waterbottoms the
court stated that navigable water bodies and tidewaters of the sea were
never included in Swamp Land Grant sales.' 5' Thus, State v. Capdeville
does not support the proposition that Louisiana intended to sell its
tidelands, whether or not navigable.
As already discussed, the court in Gulf Oil analyzed the intent of
Act 75 of 1880, which authorized the sale of "sea marsh or prairie
subject to tidal overflow," and found it authorized only the sale of'
those lands received in the federal grants of 1849 and 1850. These grants
did not include lands acquired through inherent sovereignty such as
tidelands.'
Board of Commissioners for Buras Levee District v. Mt. Forest Fur
Farms of America"' involved a dispute over lands which had been
146. 130 La. 604, 58 So. 405 (1912). See also supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
147. Id. at 611, 58 So. at 407.
148. Id., 58 So. at 407.
149. State ex rel. Board of Comm'rs of Atchfalaya Basin Levee District v. Capdeville,
146 La. 94, 107, 83 So. 421, 425 (1919). See supra discussion at notes 106, 107.
150. Capdeville, 146 La. at 94, 83 So. at 421.
151. Id., 83 So. at 421. See supra text accompanying notes 106, 107.
152. See supra discussion at notes 76, 77.
153. 178 La. Ann. 696, 152 So. 497 (1933).
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alienated by the state and a contest over boundary lines near an oil
well. The legislature had transferred to the Buras Levee District, a
political subdivision of the state, by Act 205 of 1910 "all lands or parts
of lands that were originally granted by the Congress of the United
States to this State or that belonged to this state by virtue of her
inherent sovereignty'511 4 and authorized the levee district to "sell, mort-
gage, pledge or otherwise dispose of said lands as provided by law."",
A plain reading of the language would indicate the state was authorizing
one of its subdivisions to sell waterbottoms acquired by virtue of its
inherent sovereignty, including navigable water bodies and all tidelands
including the sea shore and sea bed. As we have already seen from
Gulf Oil, interpreting Act 205 of 1910 to authorize alienation of navigable
waters or the shores and bed of the sea would be directly against strong
public policy and invalid under the holding in that case. 5 6 Can Act 205
be interpreted then to authorize the alienation of nonnavigable tidelands?
Aside from applying Gulf Oil to nonnavigable tidelands, there are other
indications that by enacting Act 205 of 1910 the legislature did not
intend to alienate them. For example, in describing the lands in question
the court stated:
A very large percentage of this territory is composed of water.
There are various lakes and bays in each of the townships, the
beds of which the state did not pretend to sell. All it intended
to sell was the land area.'57
No mention is made of navigability; therefore, the court appears to be
asserting that the state did not intend to sell any waterbottoms. Later
the court stated:
The state intended to grant, and did grant, to the levee board,
and the board intended to sell, and did sell, to Jordan, trustee,
all the land area within this parallelogram ... this being ap-
parent, because the state was obligated under legislative enact-
ment to transfer all its lands of this character to the board;
... The maps show that each of the quarter sections mentioned
is entirely within either Lake Baptiste or Lake Grande Ecaille.
Hence no sale, of course."8
This language strongly suggests that no sales of waterbottoms were
intended. Earlier the court had made a general pronouncement regarding
154. Id. at 703-05, 152 So. at 499 (emphasis added); 1910 La. Acts No. 205, § Ii.
155. 1910 La. Acts No. 205, § 11.
156. Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d 576, 592 (La. 1975).
157. Mt. Forest Fur Farms, 178 La. Ann. at 697, 152 So. at 498 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 718, 152 So. at 503 (emphasis added).
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the difference between lands acquired through inherent sovereignty and
those acquired under the Swamp Land Grants:
The state owns, by virtue of its inherent sovereignty, all tidal
overflow lands within its boundaries. It is entitled to receive
from the government all so-called swamp lands under the Swamp
Land Act of March 2, 1849. The lands in this section of the
state are all low; some of them being tidal overflow and owned
by the state by virtue of that fact. Some of them are swamp
lands as defined by the act of 1849.'19
Again, this language raises the question of the meaning of the term
"tidal overflow." Some of the acts authorizing the sale of lands acquired
in the Swamp Land Grants used the term "tidal overflow" and "regular
tidal overflow,"'' 1 but the court here is using the term "tidal overflow"
to describe inherent sovereignty lands. Thus, we see another indication
of confusion in describing lands being sold, and a lack of express intent
to alienate nonnavigable tidelands.
In State v. N.A. Baker, 161 the state was again contesting title to
lands that had been sold pursuant to Act 215 of 1908. In the opinion,
the contract of sale by which the Buras Levee District sold the disputed
property to N.A. Baker is reproduced verbatim. The contract contains
the following clause: "It is a further condition that the said board of
commissioners for the Buras levee district shall transfer only the lands
of the various sections, and not to waterbottoms." 16 2 In this particular
sale, then, the levee board, a political subdivision of the state, made it
clear that no waterbottoms were to be transferred. Was this specific
reservation limited only to this contract, or was it a standard clause?
Such language weakens the theory that the state intended to sell any
waterbottoms including nonnavigable tidelands. N.A. Baker also distin-
guishes between swamp and overflowed land acquired under the Swamp
Land Grants and that belonging to the state by virtue of inherent
sovereignty.' 63 This is more evidence that the acts conveying lands ac-
quired through the Swamp Land Grants did not purport to transfer
nonnavigable tidelands which are sovereignty lands. So there is hardly
convincing evidence that the state clearly or expressly alienated its non-
navigable tidelands from the public trust.
159. Id. at 704-05, 152 So. at 499 (emphasis added).
160. See Appendix: 1859 La. Acts No. 197; 1870 La. Acts No. 38; 1871 La. Acts No.
104, 1880 La. Acts No. 75.
161. State ex rel. Board of Comm'rs of Buras Levee District v. N.A. Baker, 146 La.
413, 83 So. 693 (1920).
162. Id. at 418, 83 So. at 695.
163. Id. at 419-20, 83 So. at 695.
1992]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
ARE ALIENATIONS OF NONNAVIGABLE TIDELANDS TO PRIVATE PARTIES
NULL OR REVOCABLE?
We have already discussed the limitations on a state's authority to
alienate public trust waterbottoms established by Illinois Central'64 and
the application of Gulf Oil to nonnavigable tidelands. '65 Under Illinois
Central the alienation of nonnavigable tidelands would appear to be
revocable. Indeed, such alienation amounts to a general abdication of
state control over a large area and a substantial impairment of the
public interest of the lands and Waters remaining. For example, public
access to the coastal area is a hotly-contested issue in Louisiana.' 66
Private ownership of tidelands will in all likelihood impair public access.
Protection of fisheries habitat is another issue that may be affected by
private ownership.' 67
On the other hand, what public interests are promoted by placing
nonnavigable tidelands in the private domain? Some may argue that
private ownership promotes commerce and industry and stimulates the
economy. However, such a direct relationship does not always exist,
especially with marginal property such as tidelands. Tidelands and wet-
lands are most productive when left in their natural state, a state in
which they provide great environmental and natural resource benefits.
However, these benefits inure to all and not just the owner who is very
often faced with the necessity of making immediate profits from his
property. Very often adverse environmental impacts are the result of
private property owners' short-term, profit-oriented activities. This has
resulted in the explosion of environmental regulations under a state's
police powers as it became obvious that the "market place" would not
address environmental problems. In the area of wetlands protection, the
clash between private property rights and protection of the resource has
become heated. Two recent United States Court of Claims decisions
have found takings in regulatory actions under section 404 of the Clean
Water Act.' 6 If private ownership of tidelands is increased by the
proposed legislation, 69 such takings claims could severely hinder the
state's ability to protect this priceless public resource. Such a result
would seem directly opposed to the public policy of the state.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 22-38.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 72-85.
166. Summersgill Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., No. 85-1015, slip op. (E. D. La.,
May 16, 1991); see U.S. Dept. of Interior, supra note 84.
167. See U.S. Dept. of Interior, supra note 84.
168. Florida Rock Indus. Inc. v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 161 (1990); Loveladies Harbor,
Inc. v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 153 (1990).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
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We have already discussed why we think Gulf Oil can reasonably
be applied to nonnavigable tidelands. 70 Under that reasoning, alienations
of nonnavigable tidelands would certainly be null or revocable. The Gulf
Oil decision is very much in line with the reasoning in Illinois Central
regarding public policy, 7 ' and there is no reason to think the same
policy would not apply to nonnavigable tidelands in light of their rec-
ognized value. As science advances our knowledge and understanding
of the coastal area, the desire to protect and maintain it has increased.
This can be seen from the increasing protectiveness of the oyster statutes
and other state ownership statutes already discussed and in constitutional
provisions. See, for example, Article VI, Section 1 of the 1921 Louisiana
Constitution " and its successor, Article IX, Section 1 of the 1974
Louisiana Constitution, which is more expansive in scope and directs
the legislature to enact laws implementing the policy:
The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and
the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the envi-
ronment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar
as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare
of the people. The legislature shall enact laws to implement this
policy.,
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the public trust mandate
of this constitutional provision in its 1984 decision of Save Ourselves
v. Louisiana Environmental Control Commission:
A public trust for the protection, conservation and replenishment
of all natural resources of the state was recognized by Art. VI
§ I of the 1921 Louisiana Constitution. The public trust doctrine
was continued by the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, which spe-
cifically lists air and water as natural resources, commands pro-
tection, conservation and replenishment of them insofar as possible
and consistent with health, safety and welfare of the people,
and mandates the legislature to enact laws to implement this
policy. 4
Article IX, Section 1 may on its own provide a constitutional limitation
on state authority to alienate public trust tidelands. Thus, an amendment
to Civil Code article 451 which has the effect of validating previous
170. See supra text accompanying notes 72-85.
171. Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d. 576, 589 (La. 1975).
172. See Appendix.
173. La. Const. art. IX § 1.
174. Save Ourselves v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (La.
1984). The court reaffirmed that the public trust doctrine underlies Article IX, § 1 in American
Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. State of Louisiana, 588 So. 2d 367 (La. 1991).
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transfers of non-navigable tidelands could be invalid under Article IX,
Section 1. Whether Article IX, Section 1 can reasonably be interpreted
to prohibit alienations of public trust lands is uncertain. The following
section discusses the court's interpretation of state responsibility under
Article IX, Section 1. In summary, while Louisiana's early treatment
of its nonnavigable tidelands was somewhat ambiguous, ample evidence
of public policy for over one hundred years is a strong indication that
nonnavigable tidelands have been retained in the state's public trust.
THE ENVIRONMENT AS A PUBLIC TRUST NATURAL RESOURCE IN
LOUISIANA
As explained earlier, the public trust doctrine protects the right of
the public, as beneficiary of the public trust, to use and enjoy public
trust natural resources free from obstruction or interference. There has
been a recent trend in court decisions in other states involving the public
trust doctrine to include the environment as a public natural resource
protected by the public trust-beyond the traditional scope of application
of the public trust doctrine to navigable water bodies and waterbottoms
and tidelands and the resources therein-and Louisiana has followed
this trend.'"5 As noted above, in addition to the origin of the public
trust doctrine in the Louisiana Civil Code, the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Save Ourselves held that a public trust obligation for the protection,
conservation, and replenishment of the natural resources of the state
was enunciated in Article VI, Section I of the 1921 Louisiana Consti-
tution and continued and expanded in Article IX, Section 1 of the 1974
Louisiana Constitution.1 6 The court also held that the "natural resources
of the state" encompassed under the public trust obligation set forth
in Article IX, Section 1, include air and water and the environment. 77
These holdings were reaffirmed by the court in its 1991 decision In re
American Waste and Pollution Control Co.'78
In Save Ourselves, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that Article
IX, Section 1 imposed a public trust duty of environmental protection
on all state agencies and officials, established a standard of environmental
protection, and mandated the legislature to implement these public trust
responsibilities."79 The court explained that the constitutional public trust
175. Coastal State Organization, supra note 2, at 133.
176. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d. at 1152.
177. Id. at 1154; Nelea A. Absher, Note, Constitutional Law and the Environment: Save
Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Commission, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 1557, 1560
(1985).
178. 588 So. 2d 367 (La. 1991).
179. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d. at 1156. Cf. Robert E. Tarcza, Comment, The Public
Trust Doctrine as a Basis for Environmental Litigation in Louisiana, 27 Loy. L. Rev. 469
(1981).
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standard for the environment in Article IX, Section 1 requires environ-
mental protection "insofar as possible and consistent with the health,
safety, and welfare of the people."'8 0 The court held that this public
trust responsibility for the environment requires: "an agency or official,
before granting approval of proposed action affecting the environment,
to determine that adverse environmental impacts have been minimized
or avoided as much as possible consistently with the public welfare.""'
Additionally, the court found that "the constitution does not establish
environmental protection as an exclusive goal, but requires a balancing
process in which environmental costs and benefits must be given full
and careful consideration along with economic, social and other fac-
tors."'' s2 In carrying out this balancing process, the court stated that an
agency must necessarily "consider whether alternate projects, alternate
sites, or mitigative measures would offer more protection for the en-
vironment than the project as proposed without unduly curtailing non-
environmental benefits."'8 3 In implementing these public trust respon-
sibilities for the environment, the legislature enacted the Louisiana En-
180. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1156-57, quoting La. Const. art. IX, § 1.
181. Id. at 1157.
182. Id. at 1157 (emphasis added). Although this decision requires all state agencies to
establish criteria for performing this balancing process, only the Department of Environmental
Quality has done so. Called the "5 IT tests" (after the name of the company whose permits
were the subject of litigation in the Save Ourselves decision), the Department uses the following
criteria for balancing the environmental costs and benefits of a proposed DEQ permit action
with economic, social, and environmental factors:
Have the potential and real adverse environmental effects of the activity been
avoided to the maximum extent possible?
Does a cost benefit analysis of the environmental impact costs balanced against
the social and economic benefits of the activity demonstrate that the latter outweigh
the former?
Are there alternative projects which would offer more protection to the envi-
ronment than the activity without unduly curtailing nonenvironmental benefits?
Are there any alternative sites which would offer more protection to the envi-
ronment than the proposed activity site without unduly curtailing nonenvironmental
benefits?
Are there mitigating measures which would offer more protection to the envi-
ronment than the activity proposed without unduly curtailing nonenvironmental
benefits?
In re Dravo Basic Materials La. D.E.Q. June 22, 1990 at page 1 (admin. hearing).
It should be noted that the Coastal Management Division of the Louisiana Department
of Natural Resources is specifically required by the legislation creating it (in addition to the
Save Ourselves holding) to weigh and balance social, economic, and environmental factors
in making coastal use permit decisions. State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act
of 1978, La. R.S. 49:214.30 (Supp. 1992); Pardue v. Stephens, 558 So. 2d. 1149 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1989).
183. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d. at 1157 (emphasis added). See Nelea A. Absher, Note,
Constitutional Law and the Environment: Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental
Control Commission, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 1557 (1985).
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vironmental Affairs Act in 19791U and created the Department of
Environmental Quality in 1983.1
ACCOMPLISHINO PUBLIC TRUST PROTECTION OF PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES IN LOUISIANA
The public trust doctrine is a source of authority in Louisiana that
is supplementary to the traditional police power of the state as a basis
for the management and regulation of natural resources. The public
trust doctrine, which is based on the state's authority to manage publicly
owned property and to preserve the public trust rights in public trust
resources that have been legally conveyed to private interests (i.e., jus
publicum rights), differs from the police power, which is used primarily
to regulate private property. 6 Since the public trust doctrine is based
on the state's authority to manage natural resources owned by the public
and protect public trust rights, regulation under the public trust doctrine
is less vulnerable than regulation pursuant to the police power "to a
challenge by a private property owner based upon the 'takings' clause
of the U.S. Constitution in cases where a State has exercised its rights
and obligations as a trustee over public trust land to restrict (or prohibit)
the activities of private landowners."' 8 7
It is submitted that, as a logical extension of its reasoning in Save
Ourselves, the supreme court would construe Article IX, Section 1 as
having also established a public trust duty of protection of all public
trust natural resources on all state agencies and officials and a standard
of public natural resources protection and mandated the legislature to
implement these public trust responsibilities. In implementing the public
trust obligation established by the Louisiana Civil Code and Article IX,
Section 1, the legislature has designated several state "public trustee"
agencies: to supervise the state's public trust natural resources; to pre-
serve, so far as consistent with the interests of the people of Louisiana,
the uses protected by the trust; to protect and maintain trust resources
and manage them so that they remain open to public use and enjoyment;
and, in general, to act as fiduciaries of the public's interests.
Among the primary state "public trustee" agencies in Louisiana is
the State Land Office in the Division of Administration, which is charged
with the general management of state-owned lands and waterbottoms1 8
State co-trustees for the management of the mineral leasing of state-
184. 1979 La. Acts No. 449, amended to read "Louisiana Environmental Quality Act"
by 1983 La. Acts No. 97, codified at La. R.S. 30:2001 (1989).
185. 1983 La. Acts No. 97, § 1061(A), codified at La. R.S. 30:2001, et seq. (1989).
186. Coastal States Organiza(ion, supra note 2, at 225.
187. Id.
188. La. R.S. 36:4 (1985 & Supp. 1991); La. R.S. 41:1, et seq. (1990).
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owned property are the Office of Mineral Resources in the Department
of Natural Resources and the State Mineral Board." 9 The co-trustees
over fish, shellfish, and wildlife of the state, state wildlife management
areas and refuges, the leasing of waterbottoms for oyster production
and shell dredging, and the permitting of aquaculture are the Department
of Wildlife and Fisheries and the Wildlife and Fisheries Commission.'19
To conserve and manage the coastal zone of the state and to manage
the Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Fund established in the 1974
Louisiana Constitution, 9' the legislature established the Office of Coastal
Restoration and Management in the Department of Natural Resources
and the Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Authority in the Office
of the Governor. 92 The Department of Environmental Quality was cre-
ated as the primary trustee agency for the environment, including air
and water quality. 93 The Department of Culture, Recreation, and Tour-
ism serves as trustee over state-owned parks and recreation areas.194 The
Department of Health & Hospitals is the trustee of the sanitary quality
of our wetlands and water bodies and the seafood found in them.' 9
The Office of Conservation in the Department of Natural Resources is
the trustee for preventing the waste of oil and gas resources found in
the state, for regulating hazardous waste subsurface injection disposal
wells, and for regulating certain other aspects of oil and gas drilling
and production activities in the state that impact the environment. 1,"
The Commissioner of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry is
the trustee for regulating the use and disposal of pesticides and their
impact on the environment.' 9' The primary function of these "public
trustee" agencies is to manage the public trust natural resources within
their respective jurisdictions in order to preserve the public's right to
189. La. R.S. 36:358 (1985 & Supp. 1991); La. R.S. 30:121, et seq. (1989 & Supp. 1991).
190. La. R.S. 36:601, et seq. (1985 & Supp. 1991); La. R.S. 56:1, et seq. (1987 & Supp.
1991); La. Const. art. IX, § 7.
191. La. Const. art. X, § 10.2.
192. La. R.S. 36:351 (1985 & Supp. 1991); La. R.S. 49:213.1 (1987 & Supp. 1991); La.
R.S. 49:214.1, et seq. (1987 & Supp. 1991); La. R.S. 49:214.21, et seq. (1987 & Supp. 1991).
193. La. R.S. 36:231, et seq. (1985 & Supp. 1991); La. R.S. 30:2001, et seq. (1989 &
Supp. 1991).
194. La. R.S. 36:201, et seq. (1985 & Supp. 1991).
195. La. R.S. 36:251, et seq. (1985 & Supp. 1991).
196. La. R.S. 36:351, et seq. (1985 & Supp. 1991); La. R.S. 30:4.1 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
As this article was being prepared, the Commissioner of Conservation denied a company's
permit to continue operation of an injection well pursuant to Save Ourselves Inc. v. Louisiana
Environmental Control Commission, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984), because the company failed
to disclose the availability of an alternative disposal technology. (BASF Injection Well Permit
Cancelled, Baton Rouge "Saturday" Advocate, January 11, 1992 at 7c, col. 1.).




use and enjoy these public resources. In addition, as shown above, all
state agencies and officials have a public trust responsibility to protect
the public natural resources of the state in order to preserve the public's
right to use and enjoy these resources. The Louisiana Attorney General
is recognized as the "trustee agency" for bringing litigation to enforce
the state's public trust responsibilities and the public trust rights of the
citizens of the state on behalf of the citizens, as beneficiaries of the
public trust. 98
Since the public trust obligation established by Article IX, Section
1 is a constitutional (and affirmative)'9 obligation, it is submitted that
the public trust responsibilities of the state should be enforceable against
"trustee agencies" by a writ of mandamus or injunctive relief brought
against a trustee agency by the Louisiana Attorney General on behalf
of the citizens of the state or by a Louisiana citizen, as a beneficiary
of the trust, and thus, an affected party. In this regard, the public trust
obligation under Article IX, Section 1 could be construed as a self-
executing obligation. Thus, for example, the Attorney General, a citizen,
or another state agency might sue a "trustee agency" for failure to
protect a public trust natural resource, or suit might be brought by the
Attorney General or a citizen to recover damages against a "trustee
agency" or a citizen who had "damaged" a public trust natural resource.
The public trust doctrine also gives Louisiana significant potential
power over federal activities conducted in Louisiana's coastal zone.
Under the federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 01 federal
agency activities and activities requiring federal permits that' affect the
coastal zone resources of a state having a federally approved coastal
management program must be carried out in a manner consistent with
the state's coastal management program. 2' Prior to conducting such an
activity, the agency or permit applicant must clarify that the activity
will be consistent. The state can review the proposed activity for com-
pliance with the state program and condition the activity so that it does
comply with the state's coastal management program or deny permission
for the activity to go forward. This is known as a "federal consistency
determination." In carrying out its constitutional public trust respon-
sibilities, the legislature passed the State and Local Coastal Resources
Management Act of 197802 and developed a coastal management pro-
gram in the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources that received
198. La. Const. art. IV, § 8; La. R.S. 36:701, et seq. (1985 & Supp. 1991); La. R.S.
30:2025 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
199. Coastal State Organization, supra note 2, at 215.
200. 16 U.S.C. § 1451, et seq. (1985 & Supp. 1991).
201. 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (1985 & Supp. 1991).
202. 1978 La. Acts No. 361, codified at La. R.S. 49:214.21, et seq. (1987 & Supp. 1991).
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federal approval in 1980.203 Thus, Louisiana has authority to exercise
the "federal consistency determination" power.
If the public trust doctrine is explicitly or implicitly incorporated
into a state's coastal management program, federal agency activities and
activities requiring a federal permit must be consistent with it. As noted
above, the state can require that the activity be conditioned so that it
complies with the state's public trust doctrine-as a component of the
state's coastal management program-in order to be conducted or the
state can deny the consistency certification and thus prohibit the proposed
activity. The Louisiana Coastal Resources Program-Final Environmental
Impact Statement states in Appendix I that Article IX, Section 1 of the
1974 Louisiana Constitution has been incorporated into the Louisiana
Coastal Resource Program.2 4 Thus, Louisiana has specifically incopor-
ated the public trust doctrine into its coastal management program.
The public trust doctrine is similarly useful to the state in assessing
federal permit applications that require a water qualification certification
by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality pursuant to
Section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act.205 An applicant for a federal
license or permit to conduct any activity must receive a certification
from the state in which the activity will take place that the proposed
activity will comply with the state's water quality standards. Similarly,
as with a federal consistency certification, the Department of Environ-
mental Quality can put conditions on the proposed activity or deny
certification and thus prohibit the proposed activity. Since the public
trust doctrine is the constitutional basis of authority for Department of
Environmental Quality, the water quality certification must also comply
with it.
The public trust doctrine is also a beneficial tool for the Department
of Wildlife and Fisheries to use in its review and commenting authority
on proposed federal activities and federal permits pursuant to the federal
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act.206
CONCLUSION
It has been our intention in this article to explain the public trust.
doctrine and its current status in Louisiana. We have shown that Louis-
iana's public trust doctrine is based in the Louisiana Civil Code, the
203. Louisiana Coastal Resources Program-Final Environmental Impact Statement. (U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Office of
Coastal Zone Management and Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, Coastal Man-
agement Section, 1980.).
204. Id. See Appendix I, at 1-1.
205. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1986).
206. 16 U.S.C. § 661, et seq. (1985).
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Louisiana Constitution, and Louisiana court decisions. We have also
demonstrated that it is arguable that Louisiana's public trust doctrine
extends geographically today to the waters and bottoms of nonnavigable
tidelands. Additionally, we have shown that all state agencies and of-
ficials are under a public trust duty to protect the public natural resources
of the state and the public's right to use and enjoy these resources,
and that the environment is among the public natural resources protected
by the public trust doctrine in Louisiana.
We hope that this article will inform and generate discussion and
debate among legal practitioners, scholars, judges, lawmakers, and.stu-
dents and the Louisiana citizenry about the nature and scope of the
public trust doctrine in Louisiana and how it can effectively be used
to protect the public's right to use and enjoy our public natural resources.
The public trust doctrine is a powerful public natural resources
management tool, which we feel has been too long disregarded in Louis-
iana. We especially hope that it will not be disregarded by those who
will influence and make legislative decisions in the 1992 Regular Session
of the Louisiana Legislature.
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APPENDIX
ACTS OF THE LOUISIANA LEGISLATURE RELATING TO PUBLIC TRUST
WATERBOTTOMS LAND SALES
Date Act or Constitutional
Provision
1853 284
1855 247 § 1
1859 197
1862 124 § 1
1870 38 §§ 12 & 14
1871 104 §§ I & 3
1880 75 § 11
1910 205 § 11
Authorized sale of nonnavigable lakes sus-
ceptible of being reclaimed
Authorized sale of land within Swamp &
Overflowed lands donated in 1849 and 1850
including shallow lakes which were not nav-
igable
Authorized sale of lands "subject to regular
tidal overflow, designated as 'Swamp and
Overflowed Lands,' within the intent and
meaning of the several acts of Congress.
(emphasis added)
Declared lakes dried up by natural causes
to be "swamp lands" within the meaning
of the 1849 and 1850 Swamp Land Grants
Authorized sale of swamp and overflowed
lands and lands subject to regular tidal over-
flow that had been included in the Federal
Swamp Land Grants
Authorized sale of swamp and overflowed
lands and lands subject to tidal overflow so
as to be unfit for settlement and cultivation
that had been included in the Federal Swamp
Land Grants
Authorized sale of sea marsh or prairie sub-
ject to tidal overflow so as to be unfit for
cultivation.
Transferred to the Buras Levee District all
lands within the district belonging to the
state that had been granted to the state by
the U.S. Congress or acquired by the state
by virtue of inherent sovereignty. Authorized
the levee district to sell the lands transferred
to it by the state.
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OYSTER STATUTES AFFECTING STATE OWNERSHIP OF TIDELANDS
1870 18 §§ 1 & 2
1886 106 §§ I & 2
1892 110 §§ I & 2
1896 121 §§ 1 & 2
1902 153 §§ I & 2
Established oyster season and prohibited dis-
turbing oyster beds on any reefs, bays, and
coasts of the state
"Be it enacted by the General Assembly of
the State of Louisiana, That all the beds of
the rivers, bayous, creeks, lakes, coves, inlets
and 'sea marshes bordering on the Gulf of
Mexico, and all that part of the Gulf of
Mexico within the jurisdiction of this State,
and not heretofore sold or conveyed by spe-
cial grants or by sale by this State, or by
the United States to any private party or
parties, shall continue and remain the prop-
erty of the State of Louisiana, and may be
used as a common by all the people of the
State for the purposes of fishing and of
taking and catching oysters and other shell
fish, subject to the reservations and restric-
tions hereinafter imposed, and no grant or
sale, or conveyance shall hereafter be made
by the Register of the State Land office to
any estate, or interest of the State in any
natural oyster bed or shoal, whether the said
bed or shoal shall ebb bare or not." (em-
phasis added); granted riparian land owners
adjoining rivers, bays, lakes, bayous, coves,
inlets, or passes the exclusive right to use
those waterbottoms within the boundaries of
their land for the cultivation of oysters and
other shellfish to the low watermark;
Same as Act 106 of 1886 but dropped "sea
marshes" and "not heretofore sold or con-
veyed by special grants or by sale by this
State, or by the United States to any private
party or parties,"
Same state ownership clause as Act 110 of
1892
Same state ownership clause as Act 121 of
1896 except added "bays" and "sounds" to
the list and added "bordering on or con-
necting with the Gulf. . ."
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1904 52 §§1 & 2







1914 54 § 1-3
1924 139 § 2
1932 67 § 1
1985 876 §3 (R.S. 56:3)
Same state ownership provision as Act 153
of 1902 except removed creeks and coves
from the list and added State ownership of
oysters and other shellfish growing on the
beds. Prohibited anyone from owning in fee
simple the bottoms of navigable waters.
No changes in state ownership provision but
added a section prohibiting state from leas-
ing for oysters waterbottoms claimed under
private title until the state had disputed the
title in court
No changes in state ownership sections
Provided penalties for oyster robbing
Same state ownership provision as Act 52
of 1904 but prohibited anyone from owning
in fee simple any waterbottoms described
therein and that no private claim would have
any effect until adjudicated
Same state ownership provision as 189 of
1910
Same state ownership provision as Act 54
of 1914 except disclaimed any effect on min-,
eral leases
Same state ownership provisions except added
"streams" to the list
Same state ownership provision as Act 67
of 1932 except added wild birds and wild
quadrupeds, fish, & other aquatic life. Act
876 deleted the prohibition against anyone
owning in fee simple the waterbottoms de-'
scribed therein. That provision was trans-
ferred to R.S. 41:14 by § 2 of the same act.
Act 876 also deleted the provision in pre-
ceding oyster statutes granting riparian land
owners the exclusive right to cultivate shell-
fish to the low watermark.
OTHER STATE OWNESH.P STATUTES
1910 258 §§l&2
(R.S. 9:1101) Asserted ownership to waters of and in all
bayous, lagoons, lakes and bays and their
beds not under direct ownership; Asserted
ownership to navigable waters; States that
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1912 62 (R.S. 9:5661)
1921 Louisiana Constitu-
tion Art. VI § 1
1921 Louisiana Constitu-
tion Art. IV § 2
1938 55 (R.S. 49:3)
1954 727
(R.S. 9:1107-1109)
it did not intend to interfere with good faith
acquisition of any waters or beds transferred.
"Actions, including those by the State of
Louisiana, to annul any patent issued by the
state, duly signed by the governor and the
register of the state land office, and of rec-
ord in the state land office, are prescribed
by six years, reckoning from the day of the
issuance of the patent." (Held in Gulf Oil
not to apply to transfers of navigable water
bodies).
"The natural resources of he State shall be
protected, conserved and replenished; ... "
"Nor shall the Legislature alienate, or au-
thorize the alienation of, the fee of the bed
of any navigable stream, lake or other body
of water, except for purposes of reclama-
tion."
Declared sovereignty of state and fixed sea-
coast boundary and ownership by declaring
full and complete ownership of the "waters
of the Gulf of Mexico and of the arms of
the Gulf and the beds and shores of the
Gulf and the arms of the Gulf including all
lands that are covered by the waters of the
Gulf and its arms either at low tide or high
tide, within the boundaries of Louisiana"
Stated it had always been the policy of the
State that navigable waters and their beds
were public things and that no act of the
legislature had been in contravention of that
policy; that Act 62 of 1912 (R.S. 9:5661)
ratified only patents which had conveyed
land susceptible of private ownership which
does not include navigable water and their
beds; that any patent purporting to alienate
navigable waters was null and void and that
no statute shall be construed to validate the
transfer of navigable or tide waters or their
beds (emphasis added)
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1954 443
1974 Louisiana Constitu-
tion Art. IX § 1
1974 Louisiana Constitu-
tion Art. IX § 3
1978 645
(R.S. 41:1701-1714)
1985 876 § 2 (R.S. 41:14)
Amended 9:1101 to add clause rescinding
and revoking purported conveyances of nav-
igable waters and their beds
"The natural resources of the state including
air and water, and the healthful, scenic, his-
toric and aesthetic quality of the environ-
ment shall be protected, conserved and
replenished insofar as possible and consistent
with the health safety and welfare of the
people. The Legislature shall enact laws to
implement this policy"
"The Legislature shall neither alienate nor
authorize the alienation of the bed of a
navigable water body except for purposes of
reclamation by the riparian owner to recover
land lost through erosion."
Proclaimed the beds and bottoms of all nav-
igable waters and banks or shores of bays,
arms of the sea, the Gulf of Mexico and
navigable lakes belong to the state and are
public lands to be protected and conserved
for public navigation, fishery, recreation, and
other interests. Prohibits alienation (except
for reclamation of lands lost through erosion
as authorized by this section) to ensure pub-
lic interests "protected by the trust"
Prohibits alienation of "the bottoms of riv-
ers, streams, bayous, lagoons, lakes, bays,
sounds, and inlets bordering on or con-
necting with the Gulf of Mexico ... except
pursuant to R.S. 41:1701 through 1714" and
states that "No one shall own in fee simple
any bottoms of lands covering the bottoms
of waters described in this section."
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